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T
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
      he provision of medical care to the sick and wounded during armed con-
flict is a foundational humanitarian law obligation. This can be seen in the 
genesis of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with Henry 
Dunant’s work following the 1859 Battle of Solferino.1 Obligations regarding 
the collection, treatment, and care of the sick and wounded, both military 
and civilian, are firmly grounded in treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols.2 During international armed 
conflict the First Geneva Convention provides a comprehensive regime for 
the protection of wounded and sick members of armed forces and other 
associated forces who have fallen into enemy hands, while Additional Pro-
tocol I expands these protections to civilians.3 The protection provided in 
non-international armed conflict is rooted in Common Article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, as well as Additional Protocol II. Further, as was 
noted in the 2005 ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law study, State 
practice establishes that the search for, collection, and treatment of the 
                                                                                                                      
1. See Founding and Early Years of the ICRC (1863-1914), ICRC (May 12, 2010), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/founding-and-early-years-icrc-1863-1914 
The Red Cross came into being at the initiative of a man named Henry Dunant, who helped 
wounded soldiers at the battle of Solferino in 1859 and then lobbied political leaders to take 
more action to protect war victims. His two main ideas were for a treaty that would oblige 
armies to care of all wounded soldiers and for the creation of national societies that would 
help the military medical services. 
2. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Ge-
neva Convention I]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.; Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of In-
ternational Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Proto-
col I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609. 
3. GEOFFREY CORN, KENNETH WATKIN & JAMIE WILLIAMSON, LAW IN WAR: A CON-
CISE OVERVIEW 90 (2018); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 8(1) (“‘Wounded’ 
and ‘sick’ means persons, whether military or civilian, who . . . are in need of medical assis-
tance or care and who refrain from any act of hostility.”). 
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wounded, sick, and shipwrecked is “a norm of customary international law 
applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”4 
However, in the twenty-first century States and other participants in con-
flict are facing new challenges in meeting these humanitarian obligations. 
One area of particular concern is the shift of contemporary operations to 
urban population centers, which themselves are undergoing dramatic 
growth. Most of these urban-based conflicts are occurring in the context of 
terrorism and insurgencies, challenging the ability of the State to govern, 
contain the violence, and ultimately control those populations with peace-
time human rights-based rules. A focus on “counterterrorism”5 that fre-
quently includes a blend of policing and military responses has created a 
complex legal and operational situation in which medical care must be pro-
vided. 
The following analysis of the provision of medical care in contemporary 
urban conflict will be addressed in five parts. Part II discusses the change in 
the operational environment to one increasingly taking place in urban areas. 
Part III addresses the determination of when an “armed conflict” actually 
exists and the impact of conflict characterization on the legal regime govern-
ing the provision of medical care. A particular focus will be the situation 
brought about by court rulings and State policy choices that frequently favor 
human rights-based law enforcement responses. The fourth Part addresses 
the availability of medical services to military personnel and civilians during 
armed conflict. Part V looks at the destructive impact of urban conflict, par-
ticularly on civilians found in that battlespace. Finally, Part VI provides an 
overview of the types of casualties that can result from urban combat. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
4. 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 396 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter CIHL]. 
5. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCI-
ATED TERMS (2018), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/diction-
ary.pdf (“Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and 
networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce gov-
ernments or societies to achieve their goals.”). 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2019 
52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. URBAN CONFLICT AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE 
 
While humanitarian law is universal, how it is applied is by necessity contex-
tual.6 From a treaty perspective, the requirement to provide medical care in 
armed conflict was primarily developed in the context of international armed 
conflict. However, even with respect to inter-State armed conflict, warfare 
has changed over the past century. As has been noted, “While statistics vary 
among studies, there is no question that beginning with World War II, the 
ratio of civilian to military casualties in war has steadily increased. Many ex-
perts believe that today 90 percent of casualties are civilian.”7 Since the end 
of the Cold War, there has been a proliferation of “non-international armed 
conflicts” resulting in military forces being engaged in a wide range of mili-
tary operations. Those operations have spanned a spectrum from high-end 
conventional style combat in urban environments, such as Fallujah and Mo-
sul in Iraq, Raqqa and Damascus in Syria, and Marawi in the Philippines, to 
United Nations-mandated peace support operations in Mali. 
Of note, the conflict in Mali is representative of a unique aspect of con-
temporary conflict. While the jihadist groups involved do not pose a mono-
lithic threat, at its heart the violence in Mali is part of a complex transna-
tional, and therefore international, insurgent threat against the governments 
of the Sahel region of Africa.8 It was the threat of the seizure of the Malian 
capital of Bamako by jihadists that prompted French military intervention in 
2013.9 Since then, the city has witnessed periodic terrorist violence.10 
It is the transnational threat posed by non-State actors, ranging from 
criminal groups challenging State governance to a complex web of jihadist 
                                                                                                                      
6. Geoffrey S. Corn, Humanitarian Regulation of Hostilities: The Decisive Element of Context, 
51 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 763, 765 (2018).  
7. Id. at 764. 
8. Firle Davies & Alistair Leithead, The War in the Desert: Why the Sahara Is Terror’s New 
Frontline, BBC NEWS (June 21, 2018), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/war_ 
in_the_desert. For an overview of the jihadist threat in the Sahel, see CHRISTOPHER S. CHIV-
VIS, THE FRENCH WAR ON AL QA’IDA IN AFRICA 7–8 (2016). 
9. CHIVVIS, supra note 8, at 93–111. 
10. See, e.g., Mamadou Tapily, Peter Walker & Charlie English, Mali Attack: More Than 
20 Dead after Terrorist Raid on Bamako Hotel, BBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/mali-attack-highlights-global-spread-extremist-vio-
lence; see also Mali Takes Terrorist Threat Seriously, Especially in Bamako, APA NEWS (Aug. 16, 
2017), http://apanews.net/index.php/en/news/mali-takes-terrorist-threat-seriously-espe-
cially-in-bamako. 
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organizations seeking to establish a global caliphate that has made the oper-
ational environment so complex.11 The security situation is further compli-
cated by the link between criminal activity and terrorism/insurgency, and the 
degree to which urban areas in some parts of the world have become an 
operational magnet for warlords and others challenging government author-
ity.12 Importantly, conflict with non-State actors, whether internal to a State 
or transnational in character, has increased the requirement not only to con-
sider international humanitarian law obligations, but also obligations im-
posed by human rights law. As will be discussed, this development can have 
significant impact on obligations regarding medical care. 
There is considerable merit to the theory that champions the approach 
that “war is war” regardless of whether an armed conflict is fought in an 
intra-State, inter-State, or transnational context.13 This is particularly true re-
garding humanitarian obligations since human suffering is common to all 
types of conflict. Warfare conducted in the “regions of savagery” contem-
plated by jihadist doctrine14 can be just as vicious and destructive as conven-
tional inter-State conflict. Traditionally, terrorism and insurgency were most 
often associated with guerrilla groups operating from inhospitable wooded 
and mountainous areas of a country, and therefore, more difficult places for 
State security forces to operate. However, the regions of savagery of con-
temporary conflict now extend to “a city, or a village, or two cities, or a 
district, or part of a large city.”15 There has been a dramatic shift over the 
past two decades to terrorists and insurgents operating in population centers. 
The conduct of hostilities in these urban environments reflects the reli-
ance on a three-stage guerrilla warfare strategy that culminates in a liberation 
stage where “guerrillas enter operations that are semi-regular and others that 
are regular, and they control some areas from which they launch operations 
                                                                                                                      
11. KENNETH WATKIN, FIGHTING AT THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES: CONTROLLING THE 
USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT 159–213 (2016). 
12. ANTONIO GIUSTOZZI, EMPIRES OF MUD: WARS AND WARLORDS IN AFGHANI-
STAN 21 (2009). 
13. HEW STRACHAN, THE DIRECTION OF WAR 207–09 (2013) (outlining the im-
portance of a unitary vision of war). 
14. ABU BAKR NAJI, THE MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY: THE MOST CRITICAL STAGE 
THROUGH WHICH THE UMMA WILL PASS [16] (William McCants trans., 2006), 
https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-
the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf. 
15. Id.  
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to liberate the rest of the country.”16 The combat that occurred in the streets 
of Mosul, Raqqa, and Damascus resembles urban fighting within conven-
tional armed conflict. In Afghanistan, the long-term U.S. military strategy, 
which hinges on defending population centers while ceding much of the re-
mote countryside to the Taliban, inevitably means that clashes will occur 
within urban areas. This was graphically demonstrated in August 2018 in 
Ghazni with the Taliban assault on that city. While Ghazni was ultimately 
left in the hands of the Afghan government, the Taliban claimed, “the con-
quest of this city signifies the failure of yet the latest American strategy,” and 
“[t]he experience of Ghazni has proven that no defensive belts of cities can 
withstand the offensive prowess of the Mujahideen.”17 The war for the con-
trol of towns and cities of Afghanistan is far from over. 
This increasing shift towards warfare in cities and towns is accelerated 
by a migration of the world’s population to urban environments. By 2008, 
50 percent of the world population lived in cities.18 It is estimated that by 
2050, this amount will increase to 66 percent.19 Further, a significant propor-
tion of this population will live in less-developed countries.20 For example, 
the Institute for Security Studies predicts that by 2030, “Lagos, Cairo and 
Kinshasa will each have to cater for over 20 million people, while Luanda, 
Dar es Salaam and Johannesburg will have crossed the 10 million mark.”21 
Likewise, Sullivan notes, “[c]ontemporary megacities may include global cit-
ies and global slums (neighborhoods where transnational gangs dominate 
                                                                                                                      
16. BRYNJAR LIA, ARCHITECT OF GLOBAL JIHAD: THE LIFE OF AL-QAIDA STRATE-
GIST ABU MUS ’AD AL-SURI 472 (2008); see also AL-QA’IDA’S DOCTRINE FOR INSURGENCY: 
ABD AL-AZIZ AL-MUQRIN’S “A PRACTICAL COURSE FOR GUERRILLA WAR” 12 (Norman 
Cigar trans., 2008); MICHAEL W. S. RYAN, DECODING AL-QAEDA’S STRATEGY: THE DEEP 
BATTLE AGAINST AMERICA 230 (2013); ALI SOUFAN, ANATOMY OF TERROR: FROM THE 
DEATH OF BIN LADEN TO THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 286–87 (2017). 
17. W. J. Hennigan, Exclusive: Inside the U.S. Fight to Save Ghazni from the Taliban, TIME 
(Aug. 23, 2018), http://time.com/longform/ghazni-fight-taliban/. 
18. ANTHONY JAMES JOES, URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE 1–2 (2007). 
19. POPULATION DIV., U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD URBANIZA-
TION PROSPECTS: THE 2014 REVISION HIGHLIGHTS, at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/352 
(2014), https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf. 
20. Id. at 2. 
21. Julia Bello-Schünemann, Africa’s Future Is Urban, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES 
(Dec. 2, 2016), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-future-is-urban. 
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local turf and are globally connected to transnational criminal networks).”22 
This means warfare and associated insecurity occurring in cities and sur-
rounding urban areas with up to three times the population of New York 
City.23 
Adding to the complexity of this operating environment is the fact that 
most of these people live in littoral regions. 24 This means providing security 
to urban areas must involve all components of military and security forces: 
land, air, and naval military forces, police forces, and the coast guard. The 
threat to littoral urban centers was most graphically displayed in Mumbai in 
2008 where military, paramilitary, and police units were required to deploy 
to counter an exceptionally destructive sea borne attack on that city by the 
Pakistan based LeT terrorist group.25 During that attack ten terrorists “were 
able to hold the world’s fourth largest city to ransom, killing 166 and injuring 
more than 300 over three nights of horror.”26 
Urban conflict in this century presents new challenges, while also resur-
recting many old ones. In terms of new challenges, fighting among an ur-
banized civilian population means, “[m]edical intervention includes pre-hos-
pital emergency medical services and in-hospital care. Responding to injuries 
caused by terrorism, insurgency, and war form a situation of ‘conflict disas-
ter’ demanding new protocols such as tactical medics and ‘counterterrorism 
medicine.’”27 Regarding the provision of medical care, State security forces 
must also interface with specific actors on the urban battlefield “where civil 
defense and non-governmental organizations—such as Médecins Sans Fron-
tières (MSF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Syria’s 
                                                                                                                      
22. John P. Sullivan, The Urban Imperative: War, Terrorism, and Insecurity in Mega Cities, 
STRATFOR (Feb. 13, 2018), https://worldview.stratfor.com/horizons/fellows/dr-john-p-
sullivan/13022018-urban-imperative-war-terrorism-and-insecurity-megacities. 
23. James Barron, New York City’s Population Hits a Record 8.6 Million, NEW YORK TIMES 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/nyregion/new-york-city-popula-
tion.html. 
24. DAVID KILCULLEN, OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING OF AGE OF THE UR-
BAN GUERRILLA 30 (2013) (noting that 75 percent of the world’s cities are coastal and that 
80 percent of the population lives within sixty miles of the coastline). 
25. Id. at 57–60. 
26. CATHY SCOTT-CLARK & ADRIAN LEVY, THE SIEGE: 68 HOURS INSIDE THE TAJ 
HOTEL 277 (2013). 
27. Sullivan, supra note 22. 
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White Helmets, and Save the Children (which was recently attacked in Jala-
labad)—provide aid and care to the besieged and threatened populations.”28 
Elsewhere the siege of cities, such as that of the port city of Al Hudaydah, 
Yemen,29 air and naval blockades occurring off the coast of that country,30 
and the naval blockade of Gaza31 are forcing participants to reassess older 
humanitarian law rules concerning the obligations of conflict participants to-
wards the civilian population.32 Among the challenges in this context is ac-
cess to life-saving medication for besieged or blockaded civilians.33 
 
III. WHICH LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNS THE PROVISION OF      
MEDICAL CARE? 
 
An essential, indeed foundational, question is what body of law governs the 
provision of medical care to those in need arising from violence in urban 
areas. Of course, an armed conflict must exist for international humanitarian 
law—and with it the obligations regarding medical care—to apply. In the 
absence of such conflict, the provision of medical care is governed exclu-
sively by human rights law.34 As the second decade of the twenty-first century 
ends, there has been a renewed focus by major military powers, such as the 
United States, on near peer warfare between States. However, international 
armed conflicts are not occurring directly between those powers, and con-
                                                                                                                      
28. Id. 
29. Mohammed Ali Kalfood & Margaret Coker, Saudis Escalate Siege of Port in Yemen, 
Alarming Aid Groups, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
08/02/world/middleeast/yemen-saudi-hudaydah-missiles.html. 
30. Yemen: Coalition Blockade Imperils Civilians: UN Should Sanction Senior Saudi Leaders, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-
coalition-blockade-imperils-civilians [hereinafter Yemen: Coalition Blockade]. 
31. 1 JACOB TURKEL ET AL., THE PUBLIC COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME 
INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010, ¶¶ 48–64, at 53–69 (2011), http://turkel-committee.gov.il/ 
files/wordocs//8707200211english.pdf. 
32. See, e.g., PHILLIP DREW, THE LAW OF MARITIME BLOCKADE: PAST, PRESENT AND 
FUTURE (2017). 
33. Yemen: Coalition Blockade, supra note 30. 
34. Katherine H.A. Footer & Leonard S. Rubenstein, A Human Rights Approach to Health 
Care in Conflict, 95 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 167, 168 (2013) (“In some 
circumstances of political volatility or violence, attacks on health care providers, facilities, 
transports, and patients take place, but IHL does not apply at all, because no armed conflict 
exists.”). 
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flicts not of an international character remain the predominate form of war-
fare. This can be seen in The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2017, which indi-
cates that at least fifty-five armed conflicts occurred that year.35 Thirty-eight 
of these were viewed as non-international ones, while ten of the remaining 
seventeen international armed conflicts between States were belligerent oc-
cupations, such as Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian West Bank.36 The 
international armed conflicts that occurred have included short-lived ones 
“between Libya and Egypt, Israel and Syria, as well as Turkey and Iraq.”37 As 
a result, it is non-international armed conflicts, many of which are protracted 
and transcend national borders, which continue to dominate the security di-
alogue. 
The non-State actor threat encompasses a wide range of violence that 
can involve isolated terrorist incidents, insurgent groups engaging in guerrilla 
warfare, or armed conflict, such as has occurred with the Islamic State, which 
approximates conventional warfare. Not all non-State actor violence rises to 
the level of an armed conflict. One area of considerable debate in the post-
9/11 security environment is when violence occurring between States and 
non-State actors crosses the armed conflict threshold. For much of the pe-
riod following the attacks of 9/11 a segment of the international community 
focused on requiring a high threshold for the existence of an armed conflict 
in a non-international context. That threshold is primarily based on the Tadić 
criteria of “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”38 
The debate has largely centered on limiting when a determination is 
made that a conflict exists, particularly in relation to transnational terrorist 
attacks. Terrorism is equated with criminal activity to be controlled by States 
exercising sovereignty over their own territory. This has included suggestions 
that “individual acts of terrorism that have been occurring around the world, 
in Mumbai, London, Madrid, Casablanca, Glasgow, or Bali, to name just a 
                                                                                                                      
35. THE WAR REPORT: ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017, at 17 (Annyssa Bella ed., 2018). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995). 
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few places” would not meet the criteria for the application of Common Ar-
ticle 3.39 However, this “individualized” approach towards assessing contem-
porary terrorism is significantly challenged by a transnational jihadist threat 
that is linked in a common cause to create its own system of governance. 
Over-reliance on the Tadić threshold has at times seemed inconsistent 
with the broader interpretation applied to the applicability of Common Ar-
ticle 3 prior to 9/11. As was noted in Abella v. Argentina, a 1997 Inter-Amer-
ican Commission on Human Rights report,  
 
[t]he most difficult problem regarding the application of Common Article 
3 is not at the upper end of the spectrum of domestic violence, but rather 
at the lower end. The line separating an especially violent situation of in-
ternal disturbances from the “lowest” level Article 3 armed conflict may 
sometimes be blurred and, thus, not easily determined. When faced with 
making such a determination, what is required in the final analysis is a good 
faith and objective analysis of the facts in each particular case.40 
 
This interpretation seems at odds with one that seeks to set a high threshold 
for the existence of an armed conflict.  
Further, in the post-9/11 period there has been a greater recognition of 
the transnational threat that jihadist groups can pose to international peace 
and security.41 Indeed, the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and 
other jihadist groups in various locations transcends multiple geographic 
borders.42 It is difficult to argue that the violence of these groups constitutes 
isolated or “individual” acts of terrorism when their linkage is perhaps more 
accurately being described as “Al Qaeda and Associated Movements 
(AQAM),”43 or broadly as the “Jihadist Movement.”44 
                                                                                                                      
39. Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More Than Meets the Eye, 93 IN-
TERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1, 8–9 (2011). 
40. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 153 (1997), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/cases/1997/ar-
gentina 55-97a.html. 
41. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2249, pmbl. (Nov. 20, 2015) (recognizing the global nature of the 
Islamic State threat). 
42. WATKIN, supra note 11, at 295–98. 
43. ABDEL BARI ATWAN, AFTER BIN LADEN: AL QAEDA, THE NEXT GENERATION 
15 (2012). 
44. See WATKIN, supra note 11, at 198–99, for a discussion of the “Jihadist Movement.” 
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As has been noted by the ICRC, the question of whether an armed con-
flict exists can “make a vital difference to the survival, well-being, and dignity 
of the victims of a conflict.”45 This is because Common Article 3 “ensures 
that the Parties to that conflict are under an international legal obligation to 
grant certain fundamental protections to the victims of the conflict and to 
respect the rules on the conduct of hostilities. Humanitarian law binds all 
Parties to the conflict, State and non-State alike.”46 Over the history of the 
development of international humanitarian law, protections regarding med-
ical care “have become more extensive and detailed.”47 However, their ap-
plicability as a matter of law requires the existence of an armed conflict. 
This is not to suggest “all IHL [international humanitarian law] medical-
care measures are universally applicable to all armed conflicts.”48 While many 
rules applicable to international armed conflicts are viewed as being custom-
ary in nature and applicable to non-international conflicts, some differences 
remain. For example, in non-international armed conflict there are no hu-
manitarian law limitations on the detention or retention of medical person-
nel.49 That said, the international humanitarian law provisions provide a 
more detailed and comprehensive set of protections for those requiring med-
ical care since,“[u]nlike IHL, which has rules designed specifically to address 
the respect and protection of health care in armed conflict, HRL [human 
rights law] instruments are formulated in more general terms.”50  
It is widely accepted that human rights law protections regarding health 
do continue to apply during all types of armed conflict and other situations 
of violence. This includes Article 12 of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, which recognizes “the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
                                                                                                                      
45. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST 
GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CON-
DITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD, ¶ 388, at 141 
(2016) [hereinafter 2016 COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION]. 
46. Id. 
47. Footer & Rubenstein, supra note 34, at 168. 
48. DUSTIN A. LEWIS, NAZ K. MODIRZADEH & GABRIELLA BLUM, MEDICAL CARE IN 
ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND STATE RESPONSES TO 
TERRORISM 6 (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657036. 
49. Id. at 7. 
50. Footer & Rubenstein, supra note 34, at 171. 
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health.”51 This has been interpreted to require the “equitable distribution [of] 
and access to health facilities, goods and services,” the provision of “essential 
medicines,” and the formulation of a “national health plan or policy.”52 In 
this respect, “IHL does not generally cover these dimensions of health ser-
vices, as it focuses on impartiality in responding to individuals in immediate 
need of care rather than on the structure and availability of services.”53 The 
operational challenge is that not all States agree that international human 
rights treaty law has extraterritorial applicability, thereby limiting the exten-
sion of these rights for some participants during overseas operations.54 Fur-
ther, it is difficult to argue that customary human rights law, which does have 
universal application, encompasses this treaty right. 
Questions regarding how human rights law is interpreted to ensure the 
provision of non-discriminatory and effective medical care also arise in “cir-
cumstances where no armed conflict exists, but where health workers, facil-
ities, patients, and ambulances are subject to threats, attacks, and other forms 
                                                                                                                      
51. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
52. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROTECTION OF 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN CONFLICT ¶ 35, at 11 (2015), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ESCR/E-2015-59.pdf; see also Footer & Ru-
benstein, supra note 34, at 180; U.N. Economic and Social Council, Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 
14, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ 
view_doc.asp?symbol=E/C.12/2000/4 (noting that among the obligations is for States to 
refrain from “limiting access to health services as a punitive measure, e.g. during armed 
conflicts in violation of international humanitarian law”). 
53. Footer & Rubenstein, supra note 34, at 181. 
54. Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of 
Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119, 
141 (2005) (“The obligations assumed by states under the main international human rights 
instruments were never intended to apply extraterritorially during periods of armed con-
flict.”); U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic 
Report of the United States of America, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 
2014) (noting that the United States maintains the position that the Covenant does not apply 
to individuals under its jurisdiction, but outside its territory); Human Rights Committee, 
Draft General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights – Right to Life, Comments by the Government of Canada, ¶ 7 (Oct. 23, 
2017), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC36-Article6Righttolife.a 
spx (then follow “Canada” hyperlink) (setting forth the Canadian view that the “jurisdic-
tional competence of a State is primarily territorial,” and that an expansion beyond the ter-
ritory of the State “would impinge on well-established principles of sovereignty”). 
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of interference and denial, HRL fills an important gap.”55 Of particular note, 
it is solely human rights law that applies in those situations. Examples include 
the 2011 political unrest in Bahrain, the situation in Syria before a determi-
nation there was an armed conflict, and in the volatile regions of Nigeria 
where vaccination workers have been attacked.56 
However, setting a very high legal threshold for armed conflict can mean 
that State authorities are confronted with levels of violence that factually 
reach levels normally associated with warfare. In those situations, in order to 
provide proper medical care to the victims of that violence human rights law 
will likely have to begin to be interpreted in a fashion that approximates the 
more specific protective rules of international humanitarian law. The poten-
tial problem this creates is that important obligations regarding the provision 
of medical care integral to that body of law may be not be incorporated. 
Acknowledging the existence of an armed conflict in circumstances where 
the levels of violence factually indicate one exists provides the most robust 
and best articulated protections for both civilian populations and the partic-
ipants in the conflict. 
More recently, there has been a greater recognition of a “totality of the 
circumstances” approach that expands the criteria to be considered when 
assessing if an armed conflict with non-State actors is in existence.57 This has 
included looking towards the standard of “internal disturbances and ten-
sions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of 
a similar nature” found in Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II as a dividing 
line between armed conflict and situations of ordinary crime that solely de-
mand a human rights-based law enforcement response. Similarly, the re-
quirement to deploy military forces, while not determinative on its own, pro-
vides another important factor that needs to be considered when assessing 
whether an armed conflict is occurring. 
                                                                                                                      
55. Footer & Rubenstein, supra note 34, at 187. 
56. Id. at 168. 
57. See Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 257 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008) http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ 
boskoski_tarculovski/tjug/en/080710.pdf (referencing the totality of circumstances); see 
also Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law, and the 
Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 693, 
731–45 (2013); Geoffrey S. Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, in U.S. MILITARY 
OPERATIONS: LAW POLICY, AND PRACTICE 67, 74–75 (Geoffrey S. Corn, Rachel E. Van-
Landingham & Shane R. Reeves eds., 2016); WATKIN, supra note 11, at 375–78. 
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The notion that an armed conflict can occur in a relatively short period 
of fighting is reflected in the 1997 Abella v. Argentina report, which found an 
armed conflict lasting only thirty hours.58 It is an interpretation that has once 
again gained prominence as the world has struggled with transnational ter-
rorism in the post-9/11 period. Applying a “totality of the circumstances ap-
proach” to incidents such as the 2000 Sierra Leone hostage rescue (4 hours), 
the 2008 Mumbai attack (68 hours), the 2012 assault on U.S. facilities in Ben-
ghazi (13 hours), and the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi (80 hours) all 
point towards the existence of armed conflicts, either as part of a broader 
conflict, or as a “one-off” attack of a relatively short duration.59 
A more flexible approach towards conflict characterization is also re-
flected in the ICRC’s 2016 Commentary on the First Geneva Convention where it 
is noted that “hostilities of only a brief duration may still reach the intensity 
level of a non-international armed conflict if, in a particular case, there are 
other indicators of hostilities of a sufficient intensity to require and justify 
such an assessment.”60 This Commentary incorporates the earlier Pictet Com-
mentary reference to the use of State military forces as one of the criteria to 
be considered in assessing if an armed conflict exists.61 The 2016 Commen-
tary indicates that “the requisite degree of intensity may be met . . . when the 
government is obliged to use military force against the insurgents, instead of 
mere police forces.”62 While some States, such as Canada, may also use their 
military forces in a domestic law enforcement role,63 it remains that the use 
of military forces to counter threats posed by non-State actors is a relevant 
                                                                                                                      
58. Abella v. Argentina, supra note 40, ¶ 1. 
59. WATKIN, supra note 11, at 293, 367–68; see also KILCULLEN, supra note 24, at 52–66 
(outlining the Mumbai assault); MITCHELL ZUCKOFF, 13 HOURS: THE INSIDE ACCOUNT OF 
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN BENGHAZI 254–80 (2014); Daniel Howden, Terror in Nairobi: 
The Full Story behind al-Shabaab’s Mall Attack, GUARDIAN (London), (Oct. 4, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya. 
60. 2016 COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 45, ¶ 440. 
61. See OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION (IV) REL-
ATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR GENEVA 35 (1958) 
(noting specifically paragraph 1.A.2). 
62. 2016 COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 45, ¶ 431. 
63. BERND HORN, NO ORDINARY MEN: SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES MISSIONS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 59–62 (2016)(setting out the history of Joint Task Force 2 and its taking 
over the domestic hostage rescue role from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 1993). 
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factor in determining if an armed conflict is in existence.64 The ICRC Com-
mentary, in effect, supports the “totality of the circumstances” approach that 
additional and more flexible factors should be applied when assessing 
whether an armed conflict exists. 
Despite this move towards a more flexible interpretation of the armed 
conflict threshold, there are additional conflict categorization issues that 
could have significant impact on the provision of medical care during con-
temporary conflict. In this context, viewing terrorism as a criminal matter 
can have a particularly important consequence in two ways.  
The first is the degree to which “states penalize—during wartime (as well 
as peacetime)—diverse forms of support, sometimes including medical care, 
to terrorist organizations,” such that “counterterrorism policies recast med-
ical care as a form of illegitimate support to the enemy,” or “reject the cor-
ollary proposition that a terrorist organization may assign a medical corps to 
work under its authority.”65 The counterterrorism approach can often “pre-
vent donors from affiliating with, funding or providing support to any 
NSAG-provided health activities,” and reduce “the ‘risk appetite’ of many 
faith-based humanitarian organizations to engage with certain armed 
groups.”66 This outcome is entirely inconsistent with humanitarian need. As 
has been clearly stated in a study of humanitarian obligations, “no one may 
be harassed, harmed, prosecuted, convicted, or punished for having pro-
vided medical care to the wounded and sick, regardless of the nationality, 
religion, status or affiliation with a party to the conflict of the person receiv-
ing such care.”67 What is required is an approach “for all armed conflicts: 
that once out of the fight, all wounded and sick fighters (and all wounded 
and sick civilians) should be cared for, and no one should be penalized for 
giving that care. In short, medical care should be above the conflict.”68 
                                                                                                                      
64. See also Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, supra note 57, ¶ 190 (emphasis 
added) (noting that the Court references the armed forces’ engagement with terrorists as a 
factor in determining whether an armed conflict exists). 
65. LEWIS, MODIRZADEH & BLUM, supra note 48, at ii. 
66. LOUIS LILLYWHITE, CHATHAM HOUSE, NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS, HEALTH 
AND HEALTHCARE 5 (2015), https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/non-state-armed-
groups-health-and-healthcare (follow “Meeting Summary” hyperlink). 
67. DAPO AKANDE & EMANUELA-CHIARA GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE ON THE 
LAW RELATING TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CON-
FLICT ¶ 86, at 33 (2016), https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Oxford%20 
Guidance%20pdf.pdf. 
68. LEWIS, MODIRZADEH & BLUM, supra note 48, at 146. 
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Second, there is the impact of both legal and policy approaches that treat 
threats by non-State actors to States as a “normal” criminal matter, often 
when States are being faced with robust insurgencies involving large-scale 
violence. Focusing on this second issue is especially important since the de-
cision to apply human rights law, either as a matter of law or policy, can have 
a significant impact on the scope of medical care obligations and the degree 
of clarity with which they are articulated during counterterrorism and coun-
terinsurgency operations. In practical terms, the legal source for the provi-
sion of medical care is not always immediately evident in the contemporary 
security environment. There are numerous situations, which, due to the na-
ture of the groups and the intensity of the violence involved, can qualify as 
armed conflicts. This would suggest that humanitarian law, supported by hu-
man rights law would govern the provision of medical care. However, courts 
and States frequently assess these situations of violence solely through a hu-
man rights-based law enforcement lens. 
The application of human rights law, particularly regarding the use of 
force can, and frequently should, be the preferred State approach from a 
policy perspective.69 This preference is logical because a law enforcement 
response has the advantage of lowering the levels of violence, as well as 
maintaining an atmosphere of “normalcy” that ultimately serves as a key in-
dicator of success in a struggle against groups seeking to undermine State 
governance.70 The challenge is that at times the desire to maintain a human 
rights law/law enforcement response does not match the threat posed by 
the non-State actor, the overall levels of violence, or the nature of the State 
response. The levels of violence and the suffering experienced by the civilian 
population are not “normal” at all. This leads to the question of how, or even 
whether, in those situations the more protective international humanitarian 
law provisions regarding medical care could be applied during situations that 
qualify as armed conflict, but which may be viewed by a court or the State 
exclusively through a human rights lens. 
                                                                                                                      
69. See WATKIN, supra note 11, at 592–95, for a discussion of the policy choice fre-
quently made by States to apply a law enforcement approach. 
70. Adrian Gueleke, Secrets and Lies: Misinformation and Counter-Terrorism, in ILLUSIONS OF 
TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 95, 99 (Richard English ed., 2015) (noting that 
“criminalization” is identified as one of the phases of a State’s response to politically moti-
vated violence. It is also noted that “[t]he attraction of this strategy in the context of internal 
challenge to the state is the implication that the state is sufficiently legitimate that the prob-
lem can be dealt with in the context of normal policing.”). 
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The best examples of a strict adherence to a human rights law approach 
can be found in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurispru-
dence dealing with internal insurgencies and terrorist threats. While that 
Court has relied on international humanitarian law “as far as possible” to 
interpret its human rights law mandate regarding international armed con-
flict,71 it has chosen not to do so in respect of hostilities internal to its mem-
ber States. Rather than overtly relying on humanitarian law when confronted 
with situations of internal armed conflict, it has chosen to apply a more ex-
pansive interpretation of human rights law. 
For example, it has applied human rights law to military operations dur-
ing the Chechen conflict, although in terms of the use of force, the Court 
has had to significantly increase the tolerance that body of law has tradition-
ally displayed towards violence and civilian casualties. This has been done by 
borrowing humanitarian law concepts without actually applying that body of 
law. The Court applied this approach during the protracted Chechen-Rus-
sian conflict. Those hostilities had clearly crossed the threshold of armed 
conflict, including two highly destructive battles between 1994 and 1996 for 
the control of the city of Grozny. During a 1995 assault on that city “the 
intensity of artillery fire reached the level of World War II battles”72 and 
“Russian military actions displayed an almost complete indifference towards 
casualties.”73 These elevated levels of violence continued into the twenty-
                                                                                                                      
71. See Varnava v. Turkey, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 13, ¶ 185 (2009), http://hudoc.echr. 
coe.int/eng/?i=001-94162 (noting that in a case arising from the 1974 Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus, the Court ruled Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Right 
to Life, must be interpreted as far as possible in light of international humanitarian law 
provisions applicable during international armed conflict); see also Hassan v. United King-
dom, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 101–02, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146501. 
The Hassan decision dealt with the occupation of Iraq. By adopting the modifying words 
“as far as possible,” the Court appears to be suggesting that human rights law might perform 
a supervisory function altering the application of international humanitarian law during 
armed conflict. There is simply nothing in the development of those two bodies of law, or 
in respect of their practical application that suggests this to be the case. See id. 
72. JOES, supra note 18, at 145. 
73. Id. (citing RAYMOND FINCH, WHY THE RUSSIAN MILITARY FAILED IN CHECHNYA 
7 (1998)). 
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first century as demonstrated by Russian military operations involving air 
and artillery strikes,74 as well as the Moscow and Beslan hostage incidents.75 
Notably, the ECtHR has consistently dealt with State military and other 
security forces engaged in what can readily be described as combat as a “law 
enforcement body in a democratic society.”76 Indeed, the Court assessed its 
actions against a “normal legal background.”77 The Court took this position 
even for situations where the force included airpower and artillery employed 
to suppress an “illegal armed insurgency.”78 Clearly, these military means and 
methods are most readily associated with the conduct of hostilities; they are 
not “normally” applied in law enforcement operations. 
While sometimes relying on humanitarian law concepts, such as those 
found in the targeting proportionality test,79 the Court has applied them 
within the restraining principles of human rights law: a strict and compelling 
test of necessity, using no more force than necessary, and the requirement 
that the force used be strictly proportionate.80 This blending of principles, 
without acknowledging their grounding in the law governing hostilities, is 
also evident in the acceptance by the Court of significant levels of collateral 
casualties (129 hostages) that occurred during the 2002 Moscow theater hos-
tage rescue.81 In contrast, the traditional human rights law approach has been 
very reluctant to accept any collateral casualties during a policing operation. 
The ECtHR also incorporated the humanitarian law concept of indis-
criminate weapons into its 2016 judgment regarding the 2004 Beslan school 
siege.82 The weapons used during this “counter-terrorist” operation included 
                                                                                                                      
74. See Isayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00 (2005) (ECtHR), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68379; Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57959/00 (2005) 
(ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68381 [hereinafter Isayeva II]. 
75. See Finogenov v. Russia, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H. R. 365; Tagayeva v. Russia, App. No. 
26562/07 and 6 other applications (2017) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ eng?i=001-
172660. 
76. Finogenov, supra note 75; Tagayeva, supra note 75, ¶ 600 (emphasis added). 
77. Kerimova v. Russia, App. Nos. 17170/04, 20792/04, 22448/04, 23360/04, 
5681/05, 5684/05, ¶ 253 (2011) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104662 
(emphasis added). 
78. Id. ¶ 246; see also Isayeva II, supra note 74, ¶¶ 190–91. 
79. See, e.g., Isayeva II, supra note 74, ¶ 176. 
80. Id. ¶ 173; see also Ergi v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 59, ¶ 79, http://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58200 (noting that a restrictive application of human rights law 
in an anti-terrorism context had been clearly articulated.). 
81. Finogenov, supra note 75, ¶¶ 231–36. 
82. Tagayeva, supra note 75, ¶ 609. 
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flamethrowers, grenade launchers, large-caliber machine guns, and tanks fir-
ing high-fragmentation shells.83 However, in confirming a reluctance to view 
these incidents as occurring in an armed conflict, one judge noted in his par-
tial dissent: “I am satisfied that the majority remained faithful to the Court’s 
standards on the use of lethal force in large-scale anti-terrorist operations, 
dealing with them as with any other law-enforcement operation and refusing to 
apply the paradigm of the law on armed conflicts to them.”84 The result of 
this jurisprudence is that there is now significantly greater authority for the 
use of force than was traditionally authorized under the human rights para-
digm, but a far more restrictive approach to the use of force than would 
ordinarily be authorized under the law governing the conduct of hostilities. 
On one level, the approach of the ECtHR could be said to track the 
unique threat posed by many non-State actors. From a practical perspective, 
the normative gap between humanitarian and human rights law—particularly 
as it relates to use of force by State actors—is often significantly reduced 
during counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. When fighting 
“among the people” military forces frequently have to limit their use of force. 
For example, military forces may apply a threat-based response rather than 
one based on the status of the individual. In contrast, police agencies are 
often confronted with situations demanding a greater use of lethal force than 
ordinarily required. Moreover, other common counterinsurgency principles, 
such as adopting a police primacy approach85 and privileging capture over 
killing insurgents/terrorists, reflect a different operational approach in which 
the use of lethal force is minimized. 
However, as Sandesh Sivakumaran noted after his review of efforts by 
courts to use human rights law to directly regulate non-international armed 
conflict, “there should not be a rush to judgement that international human 
rights law holds the answer to all the problems.”86 A particular challenge 
presented by this jurisprudence is the lack of flexibility that accompanies le-
gal rulings such as those of the ECtHR. When a State makes a policy choice 
to adopt a police primacy approach during its counterterrorism operations it 
retains the option of conducting more traditional hostilities when warranted. 
What is left unaddressed in the jurisprudence of the Court is whether this 
                                                                                                                      
83. Id. ¶ 608. 
84. Id. ¶ 1, at 168 (partial dissent by Pinto De Albuquerque, J.) (emphasis added). 
85. DAVID H. BAYLEY & ROBERT M. PERITO, THE POLICE IN WAR: FIGHTING INSUR-
GENCY, TERRORISM, AND VIOLENT CRIME 68–69 (2010). 
86. SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
99 (2012). 
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blended form of law can effectively address the full range of security threats 
posed by many non-State actors. 
The more permissive international humanitarian law rules governing 
hostilities, including during non-international armed conflicts, and the hu-
manitarian obligations enshrined in that body of law were developed out of 
necessity. It is difficult to see how the ECtHR approach could adequately 
address the violence that occurred in cities such as Grozny, Mosul, Fallujah, 
or Raqqa. With its individualized approach, human rights law is not well 
suited to address widespread and intensive violence, the nature of military 
operations, or the use of force frequently associated with armed conflict. At 
times, the Court’s adherence to restrictive human rights principles appears 
to be disconnected from the realities of the security situation involved and 
the threat facing States, particularly during urban conflict. One commenta-
tor, noting the challenges caused by the ECtHR approach towards detention 
in non-international armed conflict, concludes that while due process re-
quirements flowing from the European Convention on Human Rights can-
not be abandoned, “it may mean being better prepared to engage the appli-
cation of the law of armed conflict and for human rights courts to show 
some humility in engaging the interface between both legal systems.”87 
If the decisions of courts are disconnected from the situation on the 
ground, there is a very real danger that the credibility of the legal paradigm 
involved, and its ability to control the violence, will be undermined. It could 
also have an adverse impact toward establishing and enforcing obligations 
on the provision of medical care. If what is needed is compliance with inter-
national humanitarian law rules, over reliance on human rights law could 
adversely affect the provision of humanitarian relief. In contrast, while a 
State may choose to apply a more restrictive policing approach during armed 
conflict, it will still be bound by its more protective legal obligations toward 
the victims of the conflict set out in international humanitarian law. The hu-
man rights law-dominate approach of the ECtHR can be contrasted with the 
example set by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
                                                                                                                      
87. Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, To Detain Lawfully or Not to Detain: Reflections on UK Supreme 
Court Decision in Serdar Mohammed, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.justsecu-
rity.org/37013/detain-lawfully-detain-question-reflection-uk-supreme-court-decision-ser-
dar-mohammed/; see also Kenneth Watkin, Accountability Fatigue: A Human Rights Law Prob-
lem for Armed Forces?, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.justsecu-
rity.org/61318/accountability-fatigue-human-rights-law-problem-armed-forces-petraeus-
united-kingdom/. 
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American Commission on Human Rights, both of which relied on interna-
tional humanitarian law to interpret their human rights law mandate in as-
sessing non-international armed conflict.88 
Applying human rights law to address the use of force by States during 
exceptional circumstances also raises the possibility of “human rights over-
reach.” Here, human rights law, developed to regulate society in peacetime, 
is applied to acts of violence associated with armed conflict. In doing so 
human rights law is altered to the point that it begins to reflect its humani-
tarian law counterpart.89 In effect, the “militarization” of human rights law 
is like the contemporary militarization of police forces in that it has the po-
tential to have a long-term negative impact on both the law and society.90 
What is not clear is how the ECtHR would rule regarding obligations for 
the provision of medical services in a conflict like Chechnya, which was in-
ternal to Russia. Fortunately, the consequence of militarizing this aspect of 
human rights law is less problematic than questions arising from the use of 
force. A key issue is one of clarity, and whether a court will go far enough to 
ensure the same level of protection under human rights law as is available 
for victims of conflict under international humanitarian law. In other words, 
                                                                                                                      
88. See, e.g., Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 70, ¶¶ 208–09 (Nov. 25, 2000), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ 
seriec_70_ing.pdf 
Although the Court lacks competence to declare that a State is internationally responsible 
for the violation of international treaties that do not grant it such competence, it can observe 
that certain acts or omissions that violate human rights, pursuant to the treaties that they 
do have competence to apply, also violate other international instruments for the protection 
of the individual, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions and, in particular, common Article 
3. 
Indeed, there is a similarity between the content of Article 3, common to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, and the provisions of the American Convention and other international in-
struments regarding non-derogable human rights (such as the right to life and the right not 
to be submitted to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment). This Court has already 
indicated in the Las Palmeras Case (2000), that the relevant provisions of the Geneva Con-
ventions may be taken into consideration as elements for the interpretation of the American 
Convention. 
89. See WATKIN, supra note 11, at 252–59, for a more detailed discussion of “human 
rights overreach.” 
90. RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMER-
ICA’S POLICE FORCES 333–36 (2013); see also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR 
COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING (2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jus14-warcomeshome-text-rel 
1.pdf. 
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can it meet the humanitarian need? It is also not certain that medical services 
grounded in a human rights law-focused model would place the same obli-
gations on all participants in the conflict. The traditional view is that inter-
national human rights law does not bind non-State actors, although argu-
ments have been presented that it does, or at least should.91 The simplest 
approach, and one realistically grounded in the scope and scale of violence, 
as well as the degree of suffering of the victims of the conflict, would be to 
acknowledge the existence of an armed conflict and apply humanitarian law. 
It is not, however, only judicial scrutiny of security operations that has 
highlighted the application of a human rights law-based response when ad-
dressing levels of violence more readily associated with armed conflict. It 
frequently arises with States deciding to apply a human rights-based law en-
forcement response to “terrorism” and other challenges to their authority. 
This approach may be motivated by a variety of considerations, including 
the traditional reluctance exhibited by States to acknowledge an armed con-
flict exists within its borders, a desire to demonstrate a successful strategy 
through the maintenance of an aura of normalcy and control, or a conscious 
decision by a State to apply a law enforcement response because it can, in 
the prevailing circumstances, limit the overall violence. To be certain, there 
are significant advantages from a policy perspective in adopting a law en-
forcement response to non-State actor threats, even when an armed conflict 
is in existence. States should be encouraged to default to this approach when-
ever possible.92 However, such an approach is only sustainable when a hu-
man rights law-based approach is feasible and effective in countering the 
threat actually being posed. 
The iconic example where such a strategy was successfully applied over 
a significant period was the nearly thirty-year Northern Ireland “Troubles.” 
The United Kingdom consistently adopted the position that this complex 
security situation, which rose to the level of an insurgency,93 was a criminal 
                                                                                                                      
91. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 86, at 95–97. 
92. WATKIN, supra note 11, at 616. 
93. See Mark Cochrane, The Role of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland, in PO-
LICING INSURGENCIES: COPS AS COUNTERINSURGENTS 107, 108 (C. Christine Fair & Sumit 
Ganguly eds., 2014); WILLIAM MATCHETT, SECRET VICTORY: THE INTELLIGENCE WAR 
THAT BEAT THE IRA 7 (2016) (“No one called it an insurgency, but it was.”); Steven Haines, 
Northern Ireland 1968–1998, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CON-
FLICTS 117, 135 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (acknowledging the existence of an insur-
gency in Northern Ireland). 
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matter.94 The UK’s ability to do so was the direct result of robust and effec-
tive mechanisms of government, including police, lawyers, courts, and pris-
ons, as well as reliance on local intelligence personnel.95 While there was con-
siderable controversy regarding the use of force, it continued to be assessed 
under a human rights law paradigm. In contrast, it has proven extremely dif-
ficult to replicate that success in seeking to counter insurgencies elsewhere, 
such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, where State governance is not as strong.96  
The relationship between a State’s choice to apply a law enforcement or 
armed force approach can be complex for both legal and political reasons. 
For example, the UK’s domestic experience can be contrasted with that of 
Colombia, which, with a change in government in 2011, altered its charac-
terization of its engagement with the FARC to one of an “armed conflict” 
from an approach that did not recognize “drug dealing terrorists as belliger-
ents.”97 For some States, the character of the conflict is masked behind a 
generic reference to “counterterrorism operations.” The terrorists are treated 
as criminals, but the operations against them are frequently conducted as 
hostilities. In Turkey, efforts since 2015 to deal with a decision by the Kur-
distan Workers’ Party (PKK) to shift from rural guerrilla tactics to urban 
operations was initially addressed with counterterrorism operations using 
“police special operations units, Gendarmerie special operations units, com-
mandos, and other special operations teams, as well as armored Army 
units.”98 A failure to restore order resulted in a shift “to mirror traditional 
military doctrine for urban warfare: besiege and isolate a city before an as-
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95. FRANK LEDWIDGE, LOSING SMALL WARS: BRITISH MILITARY FAILURE IN IRAQ 
AND AFGHANISTAN 219–21 (2011); MATCHETT, supra note 93, at 85–97; Cochrane, supra 
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96. LEDWIDGE, supra note 95, at 164–65; MATCHETT, supra note 93, at 251–66. 
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sault to cut logistical support to the enemy inside, undercutting their capa-
bilities and will to continue fighting.”99 These forms of mixed approaches 
can create confusion as to what principles of law are governing State action 
in terms of the use of force, as well as the extent of State obligations regard-
ing the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
Uncertainty can develop in other contexts. In December 2017, the Iraq 
government claimed final victory over the Islamic State,100 which would or-
dinarily suggest the establishment of normalcy and peace. However, that 
non-State organization is far from defeated, with Iraq facing continued in-
surgent attacks101 from an estimated 15,500 to 17,100 Islamic State fight-
ers.102 Likewise, Nigeria has been engaged in an armed conflict with Boko 
Haram from possibly as early as 2009,103 with the government seeking to 
defeat the terrorist group militarily, while at the same time endeavoring to 
bring prosecutions against its members and supporters under criminal ter-
rorism legislation.104 In July 2018, the President of Nigeria announced that 
the northeast of the country was in a post-conflict stabilization phase, which 
again implies “a total end to hostilities.”105 However, hostilities continue in a 
region beset with insecurity from various armed groups.106 These situations 
                                                                                                                      
99. Id. 
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raise the question of at what point normalcy returns and whether State obli-
gations, including the provision of medical care to victims of the violence, 
will or should be governed exclusively by human rights law. 
For many Western States, the response to the jihadist threat outwardly 
reflects a bifurcated approach with the reliance on a human rights or human-
itarian law framework being geographically dependent. For example, the 
French President declared the November 13, 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris 
to be “an act of war that was committed by a terrorist army, a jihadist army, 
Daesh, against France.”107 However, the response, while including a call of 
military forces, invoked domestic emergency powers.108 Externally, while al-
ready engaged in airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, the French military immediately 
retaliated by conducting increased bombing attacks against jihadist targets in 
Syria.109 As has been noted by Gilles Kepel, “The struggle against ISIS in 
Syria and Iraq certainly requires military means—notably, the navy and the 
air force. But the fight against terrorism on French, Belgian, German or any 
other Western territory is first of all a matter for the police.”110 
The reason France and other Western States are able to adopt this ap-
proach domestically is that their mechanisms of governance are robust and 
capable, albeit frequently with the assistance of emergency powers and the 
use of military forces,111 and the threat remains at a level where such a re-
sponse is effective. That they cannot do so internationally reflects the fact 
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15/world/africa/nigeria-zamfara-violence-buhari.html. 
107. Adam Nossiter, Aurlien Breeden & Katrin Bennhold, Three Teams of Coordinated 
Attackers Carried Out Assault on Paris, Officials Say; Hollande Blames ISIS, NEW YORK TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/paris-terrorist-at-
tacks.html. 
108. Id.; see also Samuel Osborne, France Declares End to State of Emergency Almost Two Years 
after Paris Terror Attacks, INDEPENDENT (London) (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/world/europe/france-state-of-emergency-end-terror-attacks-paris-isis-ter-
rorism-alerts-warning-risk-reduced-a8029311.html. 
109. Alisa J. Rubin & Anne Barnard, France Strikes ISIS Targets in Syria in Retaliation for 
Attacks, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/ 
world/europe/paris-terror-attack.html. 
110. GILLES KEPEL, TERROR IN FRANCE: THE RISE OF JIHAD IN THE WEST, at xviii 
(2015). 
111. Robert Booth, Vikram Dodd, Sandra Laville & Ewen MacAskill, Soldiers on UK 
Streets as Threat Raised to Critical after Manchester Bombing, GUARDIAN (London) (May 23, 2017), 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2019 
74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that these States, and those they support, do not exercise the same level of 
control in the safe havens from which the threats are being generated. 
While it might be tempting to dismiss President Hollande’s declaration 
that the 2015 Paris attacks were an act of war as being merely rhetorical in 
nature, it has been posited that involvement in the Coalition fighting against 
ISIS in Iraq and Syria extends the application of international humanitarian 
law to the territory of the participating States.112 In this regard, it has been 
suggested by the ICRC that international humanitarian law applies in the 
territory of assisting States involved in an extraterritorial non-international 
armed conflict since they “should not be able to shield themselves from the 
operation of the principle of equality of belligerents under IHL once they 
have become a party to this type of armed conflict beyond their borders.”113 
However, as noted previously, the State policy choice of remaining within a 
human rights law-based paradigm when it is feasible and effective has been 
the preferred option. 
The threats to State security that potentially engage a human rights law 
and international humanitarian law interface extend beyond traditional in-
surgencies and jihadist terrorism to transnational criminal gangs. As noted 
by Ioan Grillo regarding the security situation in Central and South America, 
 
the cartels spent their billions building armies of assassins who carry out 
massacres comparable to those in war zones and outgun police. They have 
diversified from drugs to a portfolio of crimes including extortion, kidnap-
ping, theft of crude oil, and even wildcat mining. And they have grown to 
control the governments of entire cities and states in Latin America.114 
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Although an estimated two hundred thousand persons were killed in 
Mexico between 2006 and 2017,115 the Mexican government has overtly as-
serted that it is not facing an insurgency116 even while periodically employing 
military forces in a manner that suggests the existence of an armed conflict. 
Indeed, although not all analysts would agree,117 the 2017 War Report con-
cluded, “Mexico’s security forces were arguably engaged in non-international 
armed conflicts with at least the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Cartel New 
Generation.”118 If that analysis is correct, it is international humanitarian law 
that would directly govern the provision of medical care and services. 
Ultimately, a State’s characterization of the response to violence within 
its borders will have a powerful impact on the legal framework under which 
the provision of medical care will be assessed. Where it has acknowledged 
an armed conflict is in existence humanitarian law clearly can be relied on. 
In other situations, either because of legal interpretation or because of a State 
decision to treat the conflict exclusively as a law enforcement matter, human 
rights law will govern. In this regard, the ECtHR has demonstrated it will 
not consider the applicability of international humanitarian law unless the 
State effectively raises the issue. This can be seen in case law dealing with the 
Chechen conflict. In its second Isayeva judgment, the Court stated that when 
determining if “a normal legal background” applies, “[n]o martial law and no 
state of emergency has been declared in Chechnya, and no derogation has 
been made under Article 15 of the Convention.”119 In similar fashion, the 
applicability of humanitarian law in the Hassan case dealing with international 
armed conflict was only ruled upon “where this is specifically pleaded by the 
respondent State.”120  
Not all courts will necessarily demonstrate such deference to the State 
position regarding their characterization of a conflict. Indeed, in respect of 
the Chechen conflict the ECtHR could have acknowledged that an armed 
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conflict was in existence notwithstanding the position of the Russian gov-
ernment, and then apply “the general principles of international law, includ-
ing the rules of international humanitarian law which play an indispensable 
and universally accepted role in mitigating the savagery and inhumanity of 
armed conflict.”121 However, given the complex political and legal factors, 
for many contemporary struggles between States and non-State actors it is 
likely that the provision of medical services will have to rely, in whole or in 
part, on a human rights law basis for such activities. 
In situations where a State has well developed medical infrastructure and 
services (most frequently in urban areas), and the violence is relatively well 
contained by the security forces, the provision of medical care under a hu-
man rights paradigm is likely not problematic. For example, while the medi-
cal services in Northern Ireland were confronted with a horrific human toll 
in the aftermath of significant incidents of violence, and at times were chal-
lenged by the number and types of injuries, it effectively provided the re-
quired medical care throughout the three decades of conflict.122 The same is 
true for Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Belgium, and other sufficiently developed States periodically facing jihadist 
attacks on their own soil. It would be expected that the medical services de-
livered under a human rights paradigm could meet the challenge, although 
adjustments may have to be made to provide effective care in terms of the 
number of injured and types of injuries.123 However, the same cannot be said 
for the violence arising from external operations, such as those in Iraq and 
Syria, where humanitarian law would ordinarily have to be relied on. 
When confronted with conflict in geographically remote areas or when 
experiencing higher levels of violence, States with less robust medical ser-
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vices can be significantly more challenged to provide medical care. For ex-
ample, the Nigerian representative to the UN indicated in May 2017 “that to 
prevent the commission of violations of international humanitarian law in 
armed conflict, the critical element to achieving that objective is the respect 
for international human rights and humanitarian law.”124 Further, the Nige-
rian government established a presidential commission “to enhance the se-
curity conditions in the northeast of the country, facilitate the work of health 
personnel and ease the movement of medical equipment and supplies.”125 
This reliance on both human rights and international humanitarian law to 
address contemporary conflict is increasingly becoming a standard position 
adopted by States and the UN. 
With many States relying exclusively on human rights-based law enforce-
ment responses to violence, not clearly indicating an armed conflict is in ex-
istence, using a geographical basis for the application of each body of law, 
or suggesting both bodies of law apply, the legal basis for the provision of 
medical care and services in contemporary conflict will frequently be framed 
in terms of human rights law. Due to the more general provisions of human 
rights law and its focus on State rather than non-State actor responsibility, 
humanitarian advocates are presented with a challenge when seeking to pro-
vide the necessary medical support to victims of the conflict. It is a challenge 
that increases exponentially when the violence experienced in urban warfare 
resembles that of conventional armed conflict. Since these situations are fac-
tually, and could legally be assessed as, armed conflict, the human rights di-
alogue will increasingly have to be framed in terms of humanitarian legal 
norms to be effective. This is particularly the case if the existing medical 
infrastructure and services cannot address the need. 
 
IV. THE PROVISION OF MEDICAL CARE 
 
Reflecting the battlefield roots of the humanitarian movement, the law con-
cerning the provision of medical care has historically placed special emphasis 
on the collection and care of injured soldiers. For many State armed forces 
medevac and the ability to evacuate soldiers within what has been described 
as the “golden hour” from injury to treatment in a well-equipped medical 
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facility is frequently a condition precedent for the conduct of military oper-
ations. As Major-General David Fraser noted in respect of Canadian opera-
tions in Afghanistan in 2006:  
 
No soldier ever went outside the wire without ensuring that we had a med-
evac helicopter within the golden hour. If that was not in the concept of 
operations . . . I wouldn’t approve it. Every man or woman had to know 
that they or their fellow soldiers would be taken care of in the event they 
were injured.126 
 
This does not mean all States are capable of providing this level of med-
ical care. In the same conflict, Afghans “were flown to Afghan medical cen-
ters with little equipment and comparatively abysmal standards of trauma 
care.”127 Similarly, deployment on UN operations is often conditioned on the 
quality of medical services available to troop contributing countries, with 
some countries even bringing their own medical facilities rather than relying 
on those provided by the UN.128 However, particularly problematic is that 
receiving medical care within the “golden hour” is not the reality for many 
civilians caught up in the violence of urban conflict.129 
The obligation that military forces provide non-discriminatory care to 
enemy wounded and sick, with treatment being based on urgent “medical 
reasons” alone, is clearly established.130 However, in the context of counter-
insurgency/counterterrorism operations, the reliance on paramilitary and 
police forces to conduct operations presents its own set of challenges since 
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these forces may not be trained or equipped to implement these obliga-
tions.131 The lack of training and equipment in turn places a particular de-
mand on States to ensure that all security forces are properly trained to either 
provide or facilitate the provision of medical care to victims of the conflict 
before they are employed. 
Even when military and other security forces are trained and equipped 
to address the humanitarian needs related to the wounded and sick, imple-
menting these obligations can present an immense challenge to military com-
manders due to the concentration of civilians in urban environments. While 
steps may be taken to encourage the evacuation of most of the civilian pop-
ulation from a city, as happened in 2004 in Fallujah,132 this may not always 
be possible or desirable. For example, in Mosul in 2016, the Iraqi govern-
ment told civilians to stay within the city in order to avoid a humanitarian 
crisis,133 although by August 2017, an estimated 140,000 families had fled, 
with 100,000 families remaining in the city.134 
Security forces inevitably will have to conserve medical resources in any 
fight to retake a city. Accordingly, this conservation “may result in the pri-
oritization of collection, care, and treatment of military wounded and sick,” 
although in respect of civilians “intervening in extreme cases, where failing 
to do so will result in loss of life, limb, or sight will almost always be an 
authorized action.”135 In turn, this discrepancy raises the issue of what care 
and treatment is available to civilian wounded and sick. 
The existence of a functioning medical infrastructure in urban areas can 
mitigate the inability of military forces to treat the civilian wounded and sick. 
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Those facilities might also be used to treat military casualties. What is not 
guaranteed, however, is that during combat operations civilian hospitals and 
clinics will be functioning, or even remain in existence. As the ICRC reported 
in December 2016, “only one of eastern Aleppo’s nine hospitals remains 
fully functional, and four are completely out of service. Medical staff are ex-
hausted and stocks severely depleted.”136 Compounding the problem can be 
the migration of civilians towards urban areas as the conflict unfolds. For 
example, in 2018 one Yemeni family fled to Mokha, which had a hospital. 
However, the hospital “had no surgeon, nor a proper intensive-care unit, 
oxygen or essential medicines.”137 Care was finally provided by a MSF facility 
six hours away in Aden. There, civilians were “crowding into ill-equipped 
hospitals and clinics with diseases, malnourished babies and injuries from 
land mines and unexploded munitions.” 138  
Accordingly, military commanders must understand and embrace the re-
quirement to facilitate access to civilian facilities, prioritize cooperation with 
the ICRC, and permit the deployment of humanitarian assistance and non-
governmental organization support in order to meet the needs of the 
wounded and sick. However, coordination with non-governmental organi-
zations and other humanitarian entities can present challenges. As was re-
ported in one study looking at the provision of medical services in the 2016–
2017 battle for Mosul, the Iraqi military had limited capacity and the coalition 
States “were unable to supply medical teams to care for civilians.”139 Further, 
 
[i]nternational non-governmental organizations (NGOs), stung by recent 
attacks on health facilities and workers, initially struggled to find their foot-
ing amid the security risks and other programming; moreover, many argued 
that their role has not and is not to provide frontline care, which should 
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remain the responsibility of warring factions as set out in the Geneva Con-
ventions and Additional Protocols.140  
 
Support was not available from Doctors Without Borders or the ICRC, and 
“[u]ltimately, WHO contracted other NGOs and a private medical company 
to manage the TSPs [trauma stabilization points] and field hospitals, drawing 
upon its experience dispatching emergency medical teams,” with funding 
provided by U.S., European and UN sources.141 
One of the issues identified in the study regarding the use of frontline 
non-military medical services to treat civilians was “concern among many 
humanitarian NGOs that the WHO frontline strategy undermined the per-
ceived independence and neutrality of all humanitarian groups, thereby erod-
ing the protections conveyed by humanitarian principles.”142 Further, the in-
sertion of the “trauma referral pathway,” which places humanitarian workers 
at substantial risk and may interrupt the provision of humanitarian aid, cre-
ated a concern that more people could have ultimately been killed “[b]ecause 
most deaths in conflict settings are due to long-term, indirect, rather than 
direct trauma causes.”143 An unwillingness by humanitarian groups to partic-
ipate complicates the ability of States to ensure adequate medical care is pro-
vided during urban conflict since those groups have become a fixture on the 
modern battlefield. This highlights the need for broader consultation be-
tween States and humanitarian groups prior to conducting operations. 
 
V. THE IMPACT OF THE CONCENTRATION OF CIVILIANS IN URBAN 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
The more civilians there are concentrated in an area of combat operations, 
the more likely that security forces will have to contend with civilian casual-
ties. Of course, military commanders in such situations must implement all 
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feasible precautions to mitigate this risk. Such steps were taken by command-
ers in battles such as the 2004 retaking of Fallujah144 and the 2016–2017 as-
sault on Mosul,145 although the same cannot be said in other situations of 
urban combat, such as Damascus.146 Nonetheless, military assaults in urban 
centers remain very destructive.147 For example, in Marawi it was reported 
that six months after Filipino and foreign fighters claiming allegiance to the 
Islamic State had stormed that urban area “[t]he heart of the city ha[d] been 
bombed and burned beyond recognition, its domed mosques pierced by 
mortar fire. Homes . . . [were] roofless, blackened.”148 The combat left 
200,000 inhabitants scattered across the southern Philippines.149 In respect 
of Mosul, there have been claims of casualties ranging from 5,805 to 40,000 
killed.150 Elsewhere little or no concern was demonstrated. The six-week 
Russian assault on Grozny in December 1994 resulted in an estimated 27,000 
to 35,000 civilians killed and close to one hundred thousand wounded.151 In 
Syria, during a forty-eight hour period in February 2018, it is reported that 
                                                                                                                      
144. Dick Camp, OPERATION PHANTOM FURY: THE ASSAULT AND CAPTURE OF 
FALLUJAH, IRAQ 152 (2009) (explaining the progression of force used to attack insurgent 
defenders). 
145. Jackson Diehl, There’s Good News in Mosul — for Now, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 
25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/theres-good-new 
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Rebuild Iraq after the Islamic State Group Defeat, MILITARY TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), 
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iraq-after-islamic-state-group-defeat/ (noting that in Ramadi “more than 70 percent of the 
city remains damaged or destroyed”). 
148. Emily Rauhala, Liberated and Angry, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/12/09/liberated-and-angry-in-marawi/. 
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250 civilians were killed in the Damascus suburbs, including fifty-eight chil-
dren, and another 1,000 wounded. In addition, “[a]t least 10 hospitals in east-
ern Ghouta were damaged by airstrikes or shelling.”152 
The danger posed to civilians has led to humanitarian efforts to limit the 
use of explosive or “wide area effect” weapons in urban areas,153 although it 
has been noted, “explosive weapons—like bombs, rockets and shells—are 
not prohibited as such under humanitarian law.”154 The increased risk to ci-
vilians associated with the use of high explosive munitions in urban opera-
tional environments must be included in targeting assessments. Further, the 
use of wide area effect weapons can raise concerns regarding the potential 
for indiscriminate targeting,155 although certain multiple launch rocket sys-
tems can fire precision guided munitions.156 Nonetheless, it is unrealistic to 
expect States to readily accept blanket restrictions or prohibitions. Advocat-
ing for this “remedy”157 without addressing the potentially critical military 
value of the weapons systems being considered, their accuracy, the effect of 
                                                                                                                      
152. Philip Issa & Bassam Mroue, Government Bombing of Damascus Suburbs Kills More Than 
100, AP NEWS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://apnews.com/b286b967a78d4b2ab2bfb18369387b8 
c. 
153. See, e.g., ICRC Q&A on the Issue of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, 98 INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 97 (2016). 
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sue-warning (reporting on a joint appeal by the UN Secretary General and the President of 
the Red Cross to take concrete and urgent action to address human suffering, including 
stopping “the use of heavy explosive weapons in populated areas”); see also Hannah Bryce, 
Stopping the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, CHATHAM HOUSE (Nov. 5, 2015), 
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targeting precautions, and the actual tactical situation in which they are in-
tended to be used is a potential recipe for operational failure.158 This is be-
cause the conduct of military operations in an urban environment is another 
area where “context” matters. As Geoffrey Corn has noted, banning certain 
weapons does not change what can be gained by an enemy operating in an 
urban environment, to the contrary, it will incentivize the “enemy use of 
such areas to gain tactical and strategic advantage.”159 
It is nearly certain that urban conflict will become more prevalent over 
time and that explosive weapons will have to be used during such conflicts, 
however, measures to limit the collateral effects of operations will be re-
quired. The motivation on the part of security forces to limit civilian casual-
ties can be particularly evident in situations of counterinsurgency where mit-
igating civilian risk can itself provide a military advantage.160 However, casu-
alties in those situations will not be reduced to zero, nor are these counter-
insurgency operations likely to be amenable solely to a human rights-based 
analysis even when conducted with a police primacy approach. 
                                                                                                                      
158. MOSUL STUDY GROUP, supra note 156, at 16 (discussing the effectiveness of artil-
lery, mortar, and multiple launch rockets as counterfire against ISIS indirect fire). Although 
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Urban centers not only present operational challenges due to the sheer 
numbers of civilians located there, they also are unique in terms of the inter-
connected nature of city life. As one senior U.S. military officer has noted, 
“preparing for operations in dense urban areas includes not only training [to 
improve] the ability to fight in cities, but also to better understanding [the] 
‘flow’” of “people, resources, information, or things in and out of the city.”161 
This means understanding “the social infrastructure, demography, govern-
ance, economics, power hierarchies, and security systems of how a city 
works.”162 Services vulnerable to the effects of destruction associated with 
military operations “include electricity, health care, water, waste-water collec-
tion and treatment, and solid waste disposal.”163 For example, the destruction 
of the water supply infrastructure “is likely to have a domino effect on other 
services (e.g., health).”164 In the context of pre-planned attacks, it makes 
sense for military commanders “to consult experts prior to the attack, such 
as their medical or engineering branch, in order to estimate the incidental 
damage of the attack.”165 Indeed, such consultation should be expanded to 
all aspects of mission planning in order to avoid damage to the greatest ex-
tent possible to the infrastructure crucial to civilian survival, or, if necessary, 
be prepared to rehabilitate those services. 
In addition, “medical units,” military or civilian, “must be protected at 
all times” and must never be deliberately attacked.166 The only exception to 
this rule is when medical personnel forfeit their protection. For example, 
civilian medical units being used to commit acts harmful to the enemy, but 
even then a cease and desist warning is required.167 Such units can include 
“hospitals and other similar units, blood transfusion centres, preventative 
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medicine centres and institutes, medical depots and the medical and phar-
maceutical stores of units.”168 In an urban context, the marking of medical 
units and transports can provide a particularly important means of helping 
to ensure their protection. However, “[p]ractice has shown that the failure 
to wear or display the distinctive emblem does not of itself justify an attack 
on medical or religious personnel and objects when they are recognized as 
such.”169 The protection is provided by the function that is performed, the 
symbols only facilitate identification.170 In any event, even if a medical unit 
is “unauthorized,” it must be “regarded as being protected according to the 
rules on the protection of civilian objects.”171 
Unfortunately, the Syrian conflict has witnessed numerous allegations of 
attacks on medical facilities.172 A commission established by the UN Human 
Rights Council reporting in June 2018 found 
 
[a] rise in attacks against official and makeshift hospitals throughout eastern 
Ghouta also markedly increased during the period under review. As hostil-
ities escalated in February, reports emerged that 28 health facilities had 
been attacked, destroying vital lifesaving equipment. Near constant bom-
bardment often rendered the transport of victims impossible, which com-
pounded their suffering, and, in some cases, led to preventable deaths.173 
 
One of the challenges for participants in urban conflict is the location of 
medical facilities. As Additional Protocol I indicates, whenever possible they 
should be located so that “attacks against military objectives do not imperil 
their safety.”174 This has obvious applicability to temporary medical facilities. 
Among the challenges of providing medical care in an urban environment is 
the level of destruction, the unclear separation between the warring factions, 
quickly changing front lines, and the need to operate as close as possible to 
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areas where combat is taking place. For security reasons, temporary medical 
facilities may have to be co-located with military personnel, including loca-
tions that are in the immediate vicinity of lawful targets, thereby increasing 
the risk to those facilities. 
It has also been noted that “[i]n low-intensity urban conflict, it is difficult 
to identify a casualty and get immediate qualified care.”175 Further, medical 
facilities and transports may not be marked for tactical reasons. This can 
make the identification of the injured, medical facilities, and transports diffi-
cult. However, this alone does not account for the troubling tendency of 
attacks on such facilities and transports. As the UN Independent Commis-
sion on Syria noted, the “pattern of attack strongly suggests that pro-Gov-
ernment forces systematically targeted medical facilities, repeatedly commit-
ting the war crime of deliberately attacking protected objects, and intention-
ally attacking medical personnel.”176 What needs to occur is the investigation 
of all incidents for which credible allegations are made that such targeting 
has taken place. 
On occasion, an investigation may not be able to reach definitive con-
clusions, or multiple investigations may result in different conclusions con-
cerning the same incident. One investigation carried out by a UN Board of 
Inquiry looked at a September 19, 2016 aerial attack that killed ten, injured 
twenty-two, and destroyed $650,000 worth of humanitarian supplies being 
transported by a joint UN-Syrian Arab Red Crescent [SARC] humanitarian 
convoy near Urem al-Kubra, Syria.177 A summary of that investigation indi-
cates that the Board of Inquiry did not have access to the data that would 
allow it to definitively identify the party responsible for conducting the 
strike.178 However, the Board summary also indicated it “did not have evi-
dence to conclude the incident was a deliberate attack on a humanitarian 
target,” 179 and, at least in that instance, “[d]espite initial reports that a medical 
clinic had been destroyed, the Board found no evidence of a medical clinic 
neighbouring the SARC compound.”180 
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In contrast, a subsequent investigation of this incident by the Independ-
ent International Syria Commission determined that the munitions used, area 
attacked and duration “strongly suggest that the attack was meticulously 
planned and ruthlessly carried out by the Syrian air force to purposefully 
hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid and target aid workers, constituting 
the war crimes of deliberately attacking humanitarian relief personnel, denial 
of humanitarian aid and targeting civilians.”181  
Despite the potential in some instances for differences in result it re-
mains essential that the accountability process is invoked. Investigations may 
confirm or absolve liability. Where the existence of a war crime is established, 
appropriate enforcement action needs to be taken. They also heighten public 
awareness of the actions taken by conflict participants. Even if no crime is 
believed to have occurred, an investigation may identify changes to opera-
tional decision making, tactics, techniques, and procedures, or doctrine that 
can reduce future incidents. 
It is also important to note that medical facilities and equipment may be 
misused by participants to a conflict. Protection provided to medical units 
ceases only if “they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian function, 
acts harmful to the enemy.”182 Allegations regarding the misuse of hospital 
facilities arose in the context of the 2014 conflict between Israel and Hamas 
where it was reported the Shifa Hospital in Gaza City had “become a de 
facto headquarters for Hamas leaders, who can be seen in the hallways and 
offices.”183 Israel also alleged that that “Hamas commandeered ambulances 
and launched attacks from hospital compounds during the conflict.”184 
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During the conflict, “17 hospitals, 56 primary healthcare facilities, and 
45 ambulances were damaged or destroyed.”185 Still, even when harmful acts 
are carried out by civilian medical units, their protection only ceases “after a 
warning has been given setting, where appropriate, a reasonable time limit, 
and after such warning has remained unheeded.”186 Further, when targeting 
a military object near a medical facility careful consideration needs to be 
given to the proportionality assessment of incidental loss of civilian life, in-
jury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects.187 
 
VI. TYPES OF INJURIES IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Combat in urban centers also raises the issue of whether the injuries suffered 
by military and civilians are greater or different from those occurring in a 
more rural setting. As has been noted recently, the focus of humanitarian 
groups has been on limiting the use of explosive weapons in urban settings. 
It does appear that the nature of armed conflict within urban settings, in-
cluding the concentration of fighters and civilians, is such that greater casu-
alties are likely to result. For military forces, cities present complex areas 
within which to operate. They traditionally demand a greater involvement of 
infantry forces and present difficult terrain to use the heavily armored vehi-
cles that have been developed to protect those forces. 
As one 2003 report noted, “[m]odern urban combat continues to be 
highly lethal.”188 The result can be a higher number of infantry casualties with 
one 1997 study reporting on the 1982 battle for Beirut indicating “[t]he 
chances of being injured in this operation was 49 times higher than any other 
operation.”189 At that time artillery was seen as the greatest single cause of 
injury,190 with death by sniper fire being greater in non-urban environments 
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due, it was argued, to the cover provided by the “three dimensional” less 
open terrain of cities.191 Later studies witnessed a change: “Compared with 
previous IDF [Israel Defense Forces] urban combat in Lebanon, the recent 
IDF data . . . show an increase in the number of bullet wounds from 13% to 
48% and a decrease in the number of shrapnel wounds from 74% to 17% of 
all injury types.”192 
Consistent with more recent studies, overall advances in protective 
equipment reduced the types of injuries with shrapnel injury more prevalent 
in lower extremities and other exposed areas.193 As the authors of another 
study of traumatic muscular skeletal combat injuries indicate, at least with 
respect to those injuries: “advances in personnel protective equipment, med-
ical evacuation, and surgical care have culminated in the fact that besides 
being survivable, most battle injuries can be treated to the point where there 
is at least the possibility of a return to duty.”194 
As with military casualties, the loss of civilian life resulting from combat 
operations in urban areas is significantly greater than in rural areas.195 Those 
civilian injuries result from artillery fire, aerial bombing, and crush injuries 
from collapsing buildings and urban infrastructure. As one resident of Mosul 
stated, “[w]e could die either by ISIS sniper or IED [improvised explosive 
device] or shelled or buried by bombs.”196 Doctors working in Syria are re-
ported to have “described patient injuries consistent with the use of bombs, 
shrapnel from mortars, artillery, IEDs, and gunshots.”197 Civilians also suffer 
from a particular disadvantage in comparison to military personnel. They do 
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not have the same level of personal protection (e.g., body armor) available 
to soldiers of well-equipped armed forces.  
Finally, as has been noted, the reverberating effects of explosive weapons 
on urban services can have considerable effect on the civilian population.198 
In this respect, 
 
the greatest impact of explosive weapons on urban services is a function 
of the extent of the damage to upstream or midstream infrastructure (i.e., 
that which produces or delivers the bulk of the service), the nature and 
extent of the reverberations downstream of the elements of any service 
component, the “domino effect” onto other services, and the time required 
to restore the service.199 
 
The effect on the physical and mental health of civilians has the potential to 
be significantly longer term than might traditionally be thought of by military 
planners and commanders.200 This means the requirement to provide medical 
care and other health services to civilians impacted by urban combat will 
extend far beyond the end of hostilities. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
As the world’s population continues to migrate towards cities, the potential 
for urban violence, including armed conflict, will increase. This can already 
be seen with insurgent groups seizing—or attempting to seize—control of 
cities such as Damascus, Raqqa, Mosul, Marawi, Ramadi, and Fallujah. Ur-
ban conflict against non-State actors covers a wide range of violence from 
ordinary crime, to terrorism and transnational crime, to near conventional 
military operations. In addition, urban areas have become the site of violent 
attacks carried out by, or on behalf of, transnational terrorist groups as part 
of an effort to extend the conflict into countries its perpetrators see as a “far 
enemy.”201 At its most violent, urban conflict has proven to be especially 
deadly for combatants and the civilians impacted by the violence. Inevitably, 
it becomes necessary to consider whether that violence has risen to the level 
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of an armed conflict. Such a determination forms the basis for the applica-
tion of international humanitarian law, which has a particular protective fo-
cus on the provision of medical care and humanitarian relief to those in need. 
Characterizing a security operation as an armed conflict will determine 
whether international humanitarian law will apply. This characterization is 
rarely straightforward, especially outside the context of inter-State conflicts. 
The challenge may be somewhat reduced by the trend away from the post-
9/11 debate that initially focused on setting a high threshold definitional 
standard for armed conflict towards a broader “totality of the circumstances” 
standard, which appears better suited to address legal classification in an era 
of complex non-State security threats. However, even where an armed con-
flict appears to exist, consideration must also be given to human rights law. 
This can occur for a number of reasons, including its general continued ap-
plicability during armed conflict, rulings by a court that view that body of 
law solely applicable to counterterrorism operations, a State’s refusal to 
acknowledge the existence of an armed conflict, or a policy decision that a 
law enforcement approach will be exclusively applied to counter the terrorist 
or insurgent threat. The complexity of the current threat environment con-
fronted by many States has increasingly resulted in an acknowledgement of 
the applicability and relevance of both bodies of law. 
One downside to relying on a human rights framework is that humani-
tarian law provides a more comprehensive and specific body of rules gov-
erning the provision of medical care that is non-discriminatory and applies 
to all parties to a conflict. This does not mean that human rights law does 
not have a role to play, particularly since it better addresses the broader di-
mensions of health care. In addition, in situations where the State has robust 
medical services, and a law enforcement approach can be effectively applied, 
victims of what is in reality an armed conflict are likely to be well cared for 
under a human rights law paradigm. The prevalence of States using a human 
rights-based law enforcement approach to address non-State actor violence 
means that there likely will be a trend towards incorporating humanitarian-
based obligations into human rights law considerations, including the provi-
sion of medical care in urban conflict. 
Ideally, State military forces will be trained and equipped to provide ef-
fective medical care regardless of which legal framework they apply, or 
whether they are operating in an urban or rural environment. However, the 
challenge of dealing with civilians who are increasingly finding themselves 
the victims of urban conflict and other security operations will remain. While 
ordinarily it could be expected that medical facilities in urban areas would be 
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able to meet the need, there is no assurance those facilities will be function-
ing or that health care professionals will be available during highly destruc-
tive combat operations. This is particularly true given the mounting evidence 
that such facilities and services are being purposely targeted. These attacks, 
and the nature of urban combat, have led to a paucity of humanitarian groups 
operating in some areas of conflict. As a result, States have sometimes con-
tracted with private medical service providers for the provision of front line 
trauma care. This, in turn, has raised questions concerning the impact on the 
neutrality and independence principles relied on by humanitarian groups. 
There can be no doubt that the concentration of civilians in urban envi-
ronments will lead to an increase in collateral injuries and death as military 
operations extend into the world’s cities. This has led to calls for limiting the 
use of explosive weapons in that environment, as well as consideration being 
given by military commanders to the reverberating effects of damage to in-
frastructure such as water and electrical facilities. However, the desire to limit 
the collateral effects of these weapons cannot ignore their continuing rele-
vance to military operations in urban environments. 
The large number of attacks that appear to have been directed against 
hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel have also led to calls for investiga-
tions of these possible war crimes. Further, injuries to military personnel op-
erating in urban environments appear to have changed over the years to an 
increasing percentage of bullet wounds rather than shrapnel wounds. Civil-
ians are even less protected and are at considerable risk of suffering injuries 
from bombing, artillery and mortar rounds, IEDs, and gunshot wounds. 
With the effects of these wounds on civilians, and the general destruction of 
civilian infrastructure in cities likely to have a long-term effect, it is more 
important than ever to reinforce the detailed international humanitarian law 
obligations for the provision of medical care. Whether these rules are applied 
under that body of law or through the interpretation of human rights law, 
the focus should be on ensuring both military personnel and civilians are 
equally protected under the law. 
 
